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Abstract 
 
In the recent generations of semiconductor devices, the semiconductor industry has been 
accelerating towards the limits of the physical sciences. As a consequence, technology 
managers in that industry face seven major challenges, which will threaten progress: 
process, complexity, performance, power, density, productivity, and quality / reliability.  
We believe that confronting these challenges requires a new approach to technology 
management both within organizations and between organizations that form the backbone 
of the industry.  We call this new approach Acceleration Management.  
 
Acceleration Management first requires that firms cultivate deep technical knowledge 
and inspire creative solutions to seemingly insoluble technical problems.  The second 
stage of Acceleration Management requires the necessary expertise to be pooled, which 
often demands inter-organizational cooperation.  This paper explores these managerial 
imperatives and analyzes how new semiconductor firms--particularly in China--have 
created niches in the value chain even during a tumultuous time in the industry's history. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The semiconductor industry’s uncanny ability to abide by “Moore’s Law,” whereby 
computing power has doubled roughly every 18 months, has transported the industry 
from a laboratory curiosity to a $150 billion a year industry.  In turn, the semiconductor 
industry has driven the digital revolution of the last fifty years.  At junctures along the 
evolutionary path of semiconductor technology, technological challenges, labeled “show 
stoppers,” have been encountered.  Each time such a show stopper threatened to derail the 
industry’s attainment of Moore’s Law, scientists and engineers from around the globe 
devised clever solutions.   
 
However, as the dimensionality of the circuitry has fallen to “nano” proportions (1 
nanometer = one-billionth of a meter), the rate of change of technological challenges has 
increased dramatically as we document in this paper.  Additionally, the internal 
architectures of chips have, in effect, changed direction.  Because of these two 
dimensions—an increase in the rate of technological change and a change in direction of 
chip architecture—we label this a period of “acceleration” for the semiconductor 
industry. 
 
In the recent generations of semiconductor devices, the industry is accelerating towards 
limits of the physical sciences.  Moore’s Law addresses the physical dimensions of the 
circuitry—as the circuitry has diminished in size, computing power has increased.  This 
relentless miniaturization had given rise to seven major challenges that are threatening to 
derail the industry’s progress: Process, Complexity, Performance, Power, Density, 
Productivity, and Quality and Reliability. 
 
We believe that the acceleration of these challenges requires a new approach to 
technology management both within organizations and between organizations that form 
the backbone of the industry.  We call this new approach to management: Acceleration 
Management.  Acceleration Management first requires that firms cultivate deep technical 
knowledge and inspire creative solutions to seemingly insoluble technical problems.  The 
second stage of Acceleration Management requires the necessary expertise to be pooled, 
which often demands inter-organizational cooperation.  This paper explores these 
managerial imperatives and analyzes how new semiconductor firms—particularly in 
China—have created niches in the value chain even during such a tumultuous time in the 
industry’s history. 
 
 
II.  Literature Overview of High-Velocity Environments 
 
Previous studies have examined how significant strategic decisions are made in “high-
velocity” environments (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Weber, 
2002).  These environments resemble the environment portrayed in this paper—lots of 
uncertainty attributable to technology change, demand fluctuations, the competitive 
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landscape, and regulatory decisions.  These studies find that, contrary to prior work in 
low-velocity settings, a greater quantity of high quality information is processed in 
shorter time periods by the most successful firms.  Furthermore, the successful rapid 
decision makers use rational decision-making processes and exhibit a greater level of 
innovativeness.   
 
While some of these findings appear paradoxical—more information used in a short time 
period for more innovative strategic decisions—they reflect the importance of speed and 
leadership in high-velocity environments.  As these authors point out, a number of 
business strategies—like an imitation strategy or a fast follower strategy—could lead to 
bankruptcy.  Market saturation by close substitutes or time delays in product release can 
prove detrimental. 
 
 
III.  Defining Acceleration Management 
 
Acceleration is defined at the rate of change of velocity in a particular time interval.  For 
velocity to change, speed can change or direction can change.  We find both types of 
changes in this stage of the semiconductor industry’s evolution.  To characterize the 
change in speed, we focus on the change in the rate of technological change.  We first 
describe how the industry’s velocity has been characterized by Moore’s Law.  We then 
describe the 7 primary dimensions along which the speed of technological change has 
increased.   
 
As for the other aspect of acceleration—a change in direction—we analyze how new 
generations of chips contain novel architectures.  While these new architectures appear to 
“change direction” from previous chip generations, they keep the industry on track to 
achieve Moore’s Law.  That is to say that chip performance in terms of computing power 
is not sacrificed even though the inner-workings of the new chips are quite distinctive. 
 
The Bourgeois and Eisenhardt studies in high-velocity environments mentioned above 
examined strategic decision-making in the early days of the minicomputer industry.  In 
contrast, our setting is a period of maturity in the semiconductor industry.  While 
maturity may connote stability, the technological challenges that are arising have led the 
industry to be anything but stable.  This instability has led to an acceleration of 
challenges that merit managerial attention and present new opportunities to potential 
entrants into the industry.   
 
 
IV.  Abiding by Moore’s Law Historically 
 
The semiconductor industry’s ability to traverse the high-velocity environment of the past 
is reflected in its adherence to Moore’s Law.  The semiconductor industry’s unique 
ability to double the electronic function on a chip roughly every two years while 
profitably selling these chips at approximately the same price has driven the industry 
since 1970 as illustrated in Figure 1.  However a very significant increase in the pace of 
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change occurred starting in the mid-1990s.   This increase occurred even though the 
complexity of the product design and manufacturing, as well as the costs of equipment 
and facilities, were also increasing dramatically.   We believe the reason the industry was 
able to profitably abide by Moore’s Law has been because of improvements in the way 
they managed this rapid technological change, what we call acceleration management.  
The companies best able to accelerate the profitable introduction and volume 
manufacturing of new technology gained enormous competitive advantage (Appleyard, et 
al., 2000; Macher, et al., 1998). 
 
Because of the increased rate of new technology introduction since the 1990s, 
accompanied by the increasing complexity of the manufacturing and design processes, 
management issues began to become more important relative to technical issues for the 
industry.  A widely accepted process technology roadmap was central to such 
management and was created and tracked based on the universally recognized Moore’s 
Law illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Since the early 1990s, this roadmap, the International Technology Roadmap for 
Semiconductors (ITRS), has provided the schedule for alignment across chip companies, 
equipment suppliers, and support industries (Kostoff and Schaller, 2001).  An additional 
and unintended effect of the roadmap was impetus for further acceleration as companies 
recognized the competitive advantage from beating the published schedule.  In fact every 
update to the roadmap since 1994 has seen a further acceleration relative to the 
previously published one.  Some of these roadmaps and their updates are shown in Figure 
2.   
 
The rate of increase in chip density reflected in the ITRS roadmap was limited initially by 
the industry’s ability to improve production yield.  By the late 1980s the rate of yield 
improvement in new manufacturing processes and the high mature process yields that 
were then attained, led to an increasing emphasis on productivity and a corresponding 
increasing emphasis on reducing the time to introduce new manufacturing processes.  
These trends gave rise to managerial imperatives namely yield management and pace-
setting development activities. 
 
This acceleration of new technology introduction could not occur in isolation within a 
particular semiconductor company, but required that the semiconductor support and 
infrastructure segments, such as semiconductor equipment and mask making, to increase 
their rate of new technology introductions apace.1   If an equipment company could not 
keep up with the rapid new process introductions of the chip companies, they would be 
replaced.  Managing multi-firm coordination has, therefore, become a hallmark of 
acceleration management. 
 
A management trend during the 1980s and early 1990s, was the decision to “in-source” 
high value-added capabilities like mask making.  Chip companies turned away from 
external mask-making suppliers.  Instead, they either began to acquire their own mask 
                                                
1 “Masks” contain the picture of the circuitry that is transferred onto the silicon wafer to make the 
semiconductor device. 
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shops or create consortia mask facilities with other semiconductor companies with 
similar needs.  The reason for this reversal was that the external mask suppliers found it 
increasingly difficult to profitably supply leading-edge masks in a timely enough manner 
to the chip companies during the crucial stage of new process development.  
 
The managerial capabilities noted above—yield management; pace-setting; multi-firm 
coordination; and in-sourcing—helped to distinguish the leading semiconductor firms.  
By the 1990s, as acceleration increased, an overarching managerial imperative became 
how to cultivate “disciplined creativity.”  Disciplined creativity was characterized by 
balancing a long-range plan for technology and manufacturing planning with short-term 
decisions that were consistent with that plan.  Next generation production process 
development could be made easier and faster if the current chip generation process was 
constrained for most synergy with the subsequent generation.   While the industry 
generally carried out long-range planning from its inception, the strategy and 
management implementation of this planning greatly improved at the leading companies 
since the early 1990s.  
 
Supporting disciplined creativity was the adoption of better methodologies and 
procedures for developing new processes and introducing them into volume production.   
The well-known “copy exactly” methodology pioneered by Intel for new manufacturing 
processes was one example of such a methodology.  Equally striking methodological 
improvements have been implemented at leading companies over the past decade 
covering design, design aids, mask-making, process development, yield management, 
process verification/qualification, and testing. 
 
 
V.  The Technological Challenges behind the Shift from a High-Velocity to an 
Acceleration Environment 
 
The semiconductor industry’s ability to abide by Moore’s Law started to be called into 
question in the late 1990s largely due to the technological challenges that were on the 
horizon.  Even though the industry successfully cleared technological hurdles in the past, 
the looming challenges were thought to be increasingly insurmountable. 
 
Seven Scaling Challenges 
 
Miniaturization has reached an inflection point by 2005.  Effects of technology 
acceleration are visible when looking at the exponentially emerging challenges of 
computer chip design as the semiconductor industry moves from one silicon process 
generation to the next.  Problems with conventional design flows began to emerge with 
the 0.35 micron process generation.  The difficulties arose because of fundamental 
physical realities that affect design and manufacturing as processes scale to smaller sizes.  
With each new process generation, factors that were previously only second- or third-
order effects have emerged as significant issues.  Figure 3 depicts the accelerating 
emergence of these design issues. 
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Advancing from one process generation to the next introduced above is only one 
dimension of semiconductor product scaling.  The six other dimensions of scaling, each 
of which has also significantly compounded the challenge of semiconductor design and 
product development, are: power consumption management; cost reduction and control; 
product complexity; performance improvement; development productivity; and quality 
and reliability.  These accelerating challenges analyzed below are changing not only how 
engineers design and oversee manufacturing but also how companies need to organize 
and manage to continue bringing successful new products to market.  
 
Product development challenges resulting from process advancement 
 
Imagine an assembly line in a factory.  As chip process generations became more 
advanced over time, the amount of work performed at a “station” increased.  At the 0.25 
micron process generation, the conveyor belt between stations slowed down (or got 
longer) because of increasing resistance and capacitance.  This resulted in the 
“interconnect wires” between logic gates leading to as much as 20% to 80% of the delay 
across the logic path.  The net effect starting at 0.25 micron was that many product 
developments were delayed due to difficulties learning how to compensate for 
interconnect delays. 
 
In the 0.18 micron process generation, interconnect complexity increased and two other 
significant design challenges emerged: signal integrity and power integrity. The remedy 
for overcoming interconnect delays that required modification to the interconnect wires, 
actually led to a new problem: capacitive coupling.  Capacitive coupling between signals 
meant that one signal could potentially electrically couple to an adjacent signal and 
corrupt its intended data value.  New methods to detect and reduce these signal integrity 
violations were required.   
 
The increased resistance required to ease the interconnect delays also effected the 
distribution of power across chips.  Without new power integrity checks, semiconductors 
could suffer power drops that would reduce the intended performance of the design, 
something akin to a power brown-out.  
 
In the next generation, 0.13 micron, the intensity of the aforementioned design challenges 
increased.  For example, the average number of signal integrity violations for a given 
design grew from 30 to about 300 for the 0.13 micron process.  At the same time, three 
new significant design challenges emerged: “in-die variation,” increased leakage power, 
and the corruption of memory cells.  
 
The first new concern at 0.13 micron was in-die variation. Prior to 0.13 micron, designers 
could be comfortable that all the circuits on one chip, or “die,” would have the same 
process characteristics.  Consistency of operation across the chip yielded benefits to the 
designer:  one could predict consistent assembly time in the “factory.”  Starting with 
0.13, the process variation of transistor strengths between different portions of the same 
chip started to vary significantly.  The assembly line was no longer predictable!   
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This complicated the design of clock timing trees.  Variations in transistor strength across 
each die made it more challenging to support a common clock domain.  Now, the 
engineer had to design the chip to be tolerant of logic functions being skewed in timing 
across different areas of the chip.  Portions of the chip that logically operate on the same 
clock had to be broken into separate clock domains and linked via well-controlled timing 
interfaces. 
 
The second new challenge was the increase of leakage power. Previously, the power 
consumed by a chip was primarily associated with the speed of operation and amount of 
logic computation that occurred at one time. This is called the active power.  Leakage 
power is power that is consumed even when a circuit is at rest.  Transistor gates act 
electrically like water faucets providing current to a digital signal line; however, these 
water faucets never completely turn off.  This leakage power had previously been so 
small that it was not a big concern.   
 
In the 0.13 micron generation, an 8x increase in leakage power occurred.  Leakage power 
became a component of overall chip power—potentially as much as 20 to 30 percent of 
chip’s power consumption. To provide engineers with a means of reducing leakage 
power, process engineers created two types of transistors:  one which scaled performance 
normally, but leaked a lot of power and another that was slower, but leaked 10 times less 
power. To manage power consumption during the design process, engineers needed to 
learn how to optimize power and use slower, low-leakage transistors where appropriate. 
Only some companies today have effective and efficient means to utilize both types of 
transistors in a design. Leakage power will continue to increase by a factor of about 8x 
across future process generations. 
 
The final significant design issue to emerge on the 0.13 micron process generation was 
due to shrinking on-chip memories.  As on-chip memories fell in size, the amount of 
electrical energy required to sustain the knowledge in a memory cell decreased 
exponentially.  In 0.13 micron and 90 nanometer generations, memory cells contain such 
a small level of energy that they can be upset and change state if hit by periodic atomic 
alpha particles that are emitted by most natural materials.  The more memory required in 
a given design, the higher the probability that a memory cell can be hit by one of these 
particles. This phenomenon is a huge concern because data integrity must be maintained.  
Engineers need to take measures that enable a design to operate properly even if memory 
cells become corrupted. 
 
The design challenges mentioned above are side effects of semiconductor process 
scaling.  Their complexity is accelerating and new issues emerge with every process 
generation.  There are six additional dimensions of scaling that are also experiencing 
acceleration of issues that have to be solved to successfully bring new semiconductor 
designs to market. 
 
Power consumption management 
 
In the market place for portable devices, the ability to extend battery life is a key 
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competitive differentiator.  The challenge to manage power during the development 
process is actually much larger.  Each new process generation drives reduction of power 
supply voltage and cuts the power available for a given design virtually in half.  At the 
same time, companies design, develop, and introduce products that are more capable and 
have many new features.  As a result, it is common to see twice the amount of logic in 
new semiconductor devices.  This in turn doubles the power consumed.  Designs are also 
required to be faster.  If the frequency is increased 50%, the power required is also 
increased by 50%.  Add the increase in leakage power noted in the previous section and 
total power may increase another 50%.  The challenge of making products more power 
efficient has dramatically increased the development challenge. 
 
This issue is even more complex. Due to increasing power in smaller spaces, new 
technology to cool the devices must be continually innovated, applied, and adapted. 
Significant mechanical engineering capability is required to enable the continued scaling 
of electronic devices.  Many higher performance devices today have exceeded the 
thermal density of a standard kitchen hot plate in number of watts dissipated per square 
centimeter. Many people complain about how hot laptop computers feel on their laps.  
This thermal density will continue to increase over time. 
 
Cost reduction and control 
 
The cost to develop new semiconductor devices has been increasing over time.  Managers 
must manage the risks associated with new product development to ensure adequate rates 
of return.  Today, engineering costs to initially develop a complex product can be in the 
$10M ballpark for 0.13 micron products and in the $20M range for 90 nanometer 
products.  With each new process generation, the chip area needed to implement the same 
design is reduced in half.  This is an obvious benefit.  On the other hand, the cost of 
making a set of masks is roughly doubling every process generation.  Mask costs were 
about $300K on the 0.18 micron process generation.  At 0.13, mask costs were 
approximately $600K. 90 nanometer masks cost roughly $1.3M and 60nm masks started 
in the $2.4M range. 
 
Another critical cost consideration has emerged with increasing complexity.  The cost of 
resources required for functionally validating that a design is free from bugs has emerged 
to be one of the largest burdens on product development.  Debugging now commonly 
takes from one to two times the number of engineers as it does to design the functionality 
of a semiconductor device.  In addition, trends showing that products are less likely to 
meet performance requirements on the “first silicon.”  Bug fixing, revalidation and 
retooling can cost as much as half the initial design. 
 
Many semiconductor products today have a life span of about three years and generate 
$5M to $10M in revenue with margins ranging from 20% to 60% or more. Over time, 
fewer products will be economically feasible as processes advance. To make matters 
more complicated, product life cycles for many consumer products are shrinking.  Cell 
phones are a perfect example of this trend. 
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Complexity dimension 
 
With the ability to put twice the function and features on the same chip area with each 
new process generation, design complexity is exponentially growing. One of the 
challenging questions is how to use this additional silicon floor space to make products 
more exciting and also how to stay within emerging design constraints and challenges. 
 
For those that are looking at the power issues described above, they ask how exciting 
products can be built by increasing the ratio of memory on a chip in the place of logic. 
Doubling logic will tend to double the power, but power does not increase even linearly 
with the addition of more memory. 
 
A significant driver of processor design overtime has been the focus on how to execute a 
“single code stream” faster.  This led to accelerating complexity for incrementally more 
performance.  It started with reducing the time to execute an instruction from multiple 
clocks to one clock; then to pipelining multiple memory accesses in parallel; then to 
executing multiple instructions per clock in parallel; then to hardware support for 
switching between more than one stream of code; then to even predicting in advance 
what instructions might be executed and executing them while waiting for a slower 
operation in case they would be used.  All this creates an exponential increase in 
complexity that has to be validated and adds to development time.  
 
Performance improvement challenges 
 
Increasing a products performance frequency enables a product to do more in the same 
amount of time, which enables creating new excitement in future products. While each 
new process generation provides a performance improvement of about 30%, certain types 
of products try to sustain performance increases of two times over the prior generation.  
The additional performance gains beyond those offered by a new process generation 
require even greater tradeoffs and complexity.  One type of performance improvement 
relies on the implementation of a given logic function with less serial logic between logic 
clocks, in other words more parallelism.   
 
While parallelism shortens time to execute, it can significantly add to the amount of logic 
to perform a given function, thus adding to the validation effort.  In addition, fewer gates 
between timing clocks result in a host of circuit issues to deal with.  One such issues is 
called “hold time” that adds to the complexity of the low level design.  Also, because the 
amount of logic operating in parallel for a given function, it exacerbates the power 
consumed by the device. These are only a few examples of the things that are affected by 
increasing performance. So pushing performance adds to the inflections that are 
occurring in all of the other scaling dimensions. 
 
Development productivity, time to market, and product lifetime challenges 
 
To minimize the time to turn out ever more complicated products, there are strategic 
changes that need to be taken by companies. Some previous examples include increasing 
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use of modules that are designed to be reused on more than one design.  This has lead to 
the emergence of a significant 3rd party intellectual property (IP) industry that specializes 
in making these “IPs.”  Because of the existence of this third party industry, small design 
houses can compete with larger traditional design companies, which have a lot of 
resources to develop their own modules.  Some estimate that by 2007, as much as 80% of 
an average chip may consist of reusable IP blocks. 
 
The EDA tool industry is continually trying to keep up with capabilities that support 
automation of best-known techniques. This implies an increasing amount of accumulated 
tool capability, as well as required maintenance.  At the same time neither the number of 
customers nor the pools of money, which can be extracted from the industry for CAD 
tools, is increasing rapidly. 
 
Quality, reliability, and design for manufacturability challenges 
 
With the increasing complexity of advance process manufacturing, the yield of good die 
on a wafer started to be dominated by systematic failures after the 0.25 micron process.  
A new inflection has emerged in the effort to maximize yield of good die on a silicon 
wafer. One approach is to distinguish the areas of a design that are critical to performance 
or operation.  In those areas, one uses normal scaled design rules. However, in other 
areas, relaxing certain design rules can enhance the yield by increasing margins of error.  
This is one example of new types of “design for manufacturability” methods that need to 
be adopted to increase competitiveness.  
 
Today, there is significant technology being developed to support improved chip 
performance by analyzing in-die variation effects on timing via statistical analysis 
methods. This type of analysis can enable trade-offs between yield and performance. 
 
 
VI.  Change in Direction: the Dual Core Architecture 
 
A company’s strategic direction needs to be reevaluated more frequently as the rate of 
change of technology accelerates.  A salient example of this can be seen in recent 
changes on how to use silicon to increase microprocessor performance.  For 30 years, 
microprocessor performance has been driven by applying more of the increasing silicon 
area to speed the execution of a single stream of application code.  Initially, 
microprocessors took several clock cycles to execute a single instruction.  Then came 
Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) technology that proved the performance 
benefit of executing an instruction in a single cycle.  RISC techniques were incorporated 
in all types of processors.  
 
Then came pipelining memory accesses to reduce the performance impact of slow 
memory access times and to overcome processor bus bandwidth.  This was followed by 
the execution of multiple instructions in parallel called Superscalar Execution.  Out of 
order execution followed, which enabled instructions to stall briefly while the hardware 
would make a good guess at the next instruction needed and would go ahead and execute 
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if not immediately dependent on the stalled result.  This is a very simplified list of the 
advances that propelled each generation’s performance at a faster rate than could be 
delivered through process improvements alone.  Each of these advances required more 
than doubling the amount of transistors in each microprocessor to increase performance.  
 
However, in roughly the last five years, it has been recognized that the resulting power 
increase to meet this rate of “single stream” performance increase will not be sustainable 
with out running into power limitations that are sometimes referred to as “The Power 
Wall.”  Avoiding the Power Wall has lead to a recent strategy change across the industry 
of pushing performance through the faster execution of multiple code streams.  
 
Multiple code streams were first implemented with Multi-Treaded execution.  More 
recently this approach is being implemented by putting two or more processor cores on a 
chip at the same time.  The shift from increasing speed through a single code stream to 
now putting multiple processor cores on a single chip is a significant strategy change 
motivated by practicality, development efficiency, and technological changes.   
 
 
VII.  Implications of Acceleration:  Impact on Business Model Evolution 
 
In the semiconductor industry, the rate of change of technology challenges are driving 
business model changes at an increasing rate.  Companies are focusing on developing 
their areas of strength and outsourcing other aspects to fulfill their product development 
requirements in light of the technical demands examined in this article.   
 
For example, a traditional application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) company used to 
have its own production facility, its own library of IP, its own reusable IP blocks, and 
developed its own CAD tools.  In the last 15 years, the need for this integrated structure 
has been dismantled.  Instead of building and managing their own production facility, 
ASIC companies now regularly work with world-class contract manufacturers, or 
foundries.  Foundries have emerged across Asia, including TSMC and UMC in Taiwan 
and Chartered Semiconductor in Singapore.  Independent assembly and test companies 
also have sprung up to support this new dis-integrated structure. 
 
Also in the last 15 years, independent CAD companies have emerged which could offer 
smaller companies with the ability to buy/license their own tools and afterward have their 
products fabricated at an independent foundry. This has given rise to the “fabless” 
semiconductor industry. 
 
The rise of the foundries and CAD companies opened up business opportunities for a 
whole new segment of the industry—independent IP companies.  These companies 
follow a business model focused on developing large, predesigned and reusable building 
blocks (IPs) that a fabless company can purchase to speed the development of a chip.2  
Many predict that an average chip design in 2007 will be roughly 80% predesigned and 
                                                
2 Reusable means that the building block can be easily integrated into many different designs as compared 
with the older approach of designing each function into a customized chip. 
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reusable building blocks.  The availability of these building blocks—many of which used 
to be system level components—has given way to the concept of building a System-On-
a-Chip (SOC). 
 
This changing landscape also supported the growth of another complementary industry 
during the last 10 years—the fabless design house, or “backend” design service.  The 
dynamics leading to the rise of backend design services included the fact that physical 
design tools became increasingly expensive, as well as the design process becoming 
increasingly challenging as noted in this article.  The backend physical design portion of 
a product could take on average a few weeks up to a few months to complete.  Unless a 
product company was developing a lot of products each year and could keep a physical 
design team busy, the cost of the design tools has become prohibitively expensive to 
support a physical design team in-house. Further, because the technology has been 
changing so rapidly, if a company does not have their design team doing physical design 
all the time, they would rapidly become out of date and could not sustain the ability to 
develop designs with good quality on predictable schedules. 
 
This change paved the way for a more recently expanding industry during the last 5 to 6 
years of the fabless backend physical design service industry or fabless ASIC companies.  
While there were companies of this type before, the last 5 years has seen expanded 
interest and funding of these types of businesses by venture capital companies.  This 
trend also has been fueled by a view that a decreasing percentage of companies in the 
future will have the expertise level to keep up with the escalating design challenges 
outlined in this article.  This suggests the possibility of a dramatic increase in demand for 
these services. 
 
Since the burst of the dot com bubble, companies have looked for ways to cut costs more 
intensely this has led to outsourcing in lower cost geographies like China and India.  
Whereas it took Taiwan over a decade to build a world-class semiconductor industry 
based upon developing the semiconductor foundry business, it may take China only 5 
years to develop companies with similar semiconductor manufacturing volumes.  With 
technological capability in China quickly rising due to strong domestic universities, the 
return of Chinese engineers who had worked internationally, and an expanded venture 
capital interest, design foundries are on the rise in China.  In addition to design services, a 
design foundry may also provide “turnkey” manufacturing through supply chain 
management.  Design foundries have reduced the design process to a systematic 
operation—design “art” has given way to “factory-like” science.  This increases 
efficiency, further reduces cost, and allows entry points for new players.  In China, one 
could anticipate that these operations may become quite large based upon the readily 
available and expanding workforce that is growing in expertise at a very rapid rate.  The 
economics of these design foundries can support a design-only business, allowing the 
customer to decide among manufacturing options.  This will create a disruptive factor in 
the U.S. market where many product companies are once again wanting to manage the 
manufacturing supply chain themselves as a way of increasing their product margin in 
this post dot com era. 
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With the escalation of technology challenges described in this article, semiconductor 
companies are increasingly working together through alliances to overcome these 
roadblocks.  One recent example saw four industry powerhouses working together to 
develop a 90nm generation design flow.  TSMC (the leading foundry), Artisan (a leading 
library supplier), Cadence (one of the top two EDA companies), and ARM (a leading 
embedded processor and related IP company) worked together to develop this design 
flow.  The flow could then be used by other companies wanting to successfully develop 
90nm products that would be fabricated in TSMC’s production facilities. 
 
This trend toward specialized firms interacting in a highly collaborative way is consistent 
with the Open Innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003).  In discussions with venture 
capitalists, we have heard recent acceptance of this multi-party approach to innovation 
because of the need to combine capabilities required to offer a complete and competitive 
semiconductor product.  We anticipate that the Open Innovation approach will not only 
be used between companies that offer different parts of a solution, but also by 
competitors that collaborate to offer improved products that benefit from the synergistic 
combination of the unique core competencies of each company.   
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
References 
 
Appleyard, Melissa M., Nile W. Hatch, David C. Mowery (2000). “Managing the 
Development and Transfer of Process Technologies in the Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Industry.” In G. Dosi, R. R. Nelson, and S. G. Winter, eds., The Nature and Dynamics of 
Organizational Capabilities. London:  Oxford University Press: 183-207. 
 
Bourgeois, L.J. III and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (1988).  “Strategic Decision Process in 
High Velocity Environments:  Four Cases in the Microcomputer Industry.”  Management 
Science, 34(7), July: 816-835. 
 
Chesbrough, Henry (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989).  “Making Fast Strategic Decisions in High-Velocity 
Environments.”  Academy of Management Journal, 32(3): 543-576. 
 
Kostoff, Ronald N. and Robert R. Schaller (2001). “Science and Technology Roadmaps.” 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 48(2), May: 132-143. 
 
Macher, Jeffrey T., David C. Mowery, and David A. Hodges (1998). “Reversal of 
Fortune? The Recovery of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry.” California Management 
Review, 41(1), Fall: 107-136. 
 
Weber, Charles (2002). “Punctuated Learning as a Source of Profitability in High-
Velocity Manufacturing Environments.” Working Paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
Fig. 1   Trend in the number of transistors on state-of-the-art logic chips from 1970 through 2005 
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Fig. 2   The ITRS Roadmaps for 1994, 1997, and 1998/99 
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Fig. 3 
 
Source: Craig Peterson, IPCore Technologies. 
